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RESPONSE TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
The county makes assertions on pages 6 and 7 of its
appellee's brief to the effect that the criminal charges
against Sheriff Meacham arose out of a contract between the
United States Forest Service and Uintah County.
DeLandfs,

response

in

the

trial

court

was

Appellant,
that

these

assertions are immaterial.
The essential fact, as stated by DeLand below, is that
"members of the Uintah County Sheriff's Department were
engaged by Uintah County and paid through the Uintah County
Treasurer to perform the work of peace officers.

The fact

that Uintah County had a separate contract with the Forest
Service which reimbursed it for these or any such payments is
immaterial to the issues presented in this litigation." (R.
233).
Moreover, the county's references on pages 6 and 7 of
appellee's brief to the opening statement of the prosecution
at the preliminary hearing of Sheriff Meacham constitutes
scant evidence.

(See references to R. 175). Nevertheless,

assuming such factual assertions to be correct, Mr. DeLand
asserts again on appeal that such evidence, even if not
controverted, is immaterial to this litigation.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

Reimbursement of defense costs is appropriate with

respect to each count of an information which is dismissed.

1

Nothing within the plain language of § 63-30a-2, U.C.A.,
requires "complete dismissal" of a multi-count information in
order to call for reimbursement.

The more sensible and fair

interpretation is to provide for reimbursement of attorney's
fees, as may be determined, for each count dismissed.

The

fact that more than one count may be joined as part of a
"single criminal episode" is irrelevant.

The case cited by

the County for illumination of legislative history, Hulbert v.
State, 607 P.2d 1217 (Utah 1980), is of no precedential value,
as all charges against Hulbert were dismissed.
authority

for

the

county's

argument

There is no

that

"complete

vindication" by dismissal of all counts of a multi-count
information is required by § 63-30a-2, U.C.A.

As to those

counts which are dismissed there is complete vindication and
reimbursement of defense costs should be provided.
II.

The information was filed against Sheriff Meacham in

connection with or arising out of an act or omission of
Sheriff Meacham during the performance of his duties, within
the scope of his employment or under color of his authority.
The county seems to be arguing that if Sheriff Meacham
committed any illegal act, he was not acting within the course
of employment. Appellant's position is that but for the fact
that the information alleged acts or omissions in connection
with the course and scope of his employment, or under color of
authority, Sheriff Meacham would not have been charged with

2

felony misuse of public moneys.

The allegations themselves

require that he be a "public officer" and such charges could
not otherwise arise but under color of authority.

The fact

that the charges were unfounded and dismissed do not alter the
fact that he was a public officer and was charged as a result
thereof and therefore charged "in connection" with alleged
acts or omissions occurring under color of authority.

The

reimbursement statute is therefore satisfied.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING ATTORNEY'S
FEES WITH RESPECT TO CHARGES DISMISSED AGAINST
SHERIFF MEACHAM.
A.

The plain

language

of

§ 63-30a-2, U.C.A.,

does

not

require complete dismissal of a multi-count information in
order to trigger reimbursement.
Both appellant and appellee agree on the law in Utah with
regard to statutory construction.

The primary objective of

courts in interpreting the plain language of a legislative
enactment is to give effect to the legislature's

intent.

State Farm Mut. Auto Ins, Co. v. Clyde, 920 P.2d 1183, 1186
(Utah 1996).
The legislature in its enactment of § 63-30a-2, U.C.A.,
said nothing with respect to situations giving rise to multicount

informations, nor did

it

attempt

to

formulate

any

theories of possible recovery wherein the charges brought

3

arose from a "single criminal episode." The statute simply
does

not

specifically

address

itself

to

multi-count

informations.
That fact however does not preclude a logical, sensible
interpretation, within the plain meaning of the statute, that
where

multiple

offenses

are

alleged

in

a

multi-count

information, the public employee is entitled

to recover

attorneyfs fees regarding the counts, "informations" as it
were, which are dismissed or result in acquittal. As used in
§ 63-30a-2, U.C.A., for purposes of multi-count informations,
the word "information" means in effect each count of the
information.

The reimbursement statute is as much or more

amenable to this interpretation as to that which the county
urges.
Uintah County's analysis along the lines of "single
criminal episode" is more confusing than helpful. Appellee's
position, by

interjecting

the

"single

criminal episode"

concept, is a red herring and fosters a reading of the statute
which the legislature clearly did not intend.

The county's

argument is that if a public employee is charged with many
counts related to a single criminal episode, required to be
filed in a single document, that document being entitled an
"Information", no matter how meritorious the public employee's
defense of all counts, save perhaps one, if all other counts
are dismissed save the one, the public employee should not
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recover

attorney's

fees

dismissed.

Such

"unreasonably

confused,

for

all

construction

the

others

renders

inoperable,

or

which

were

the

statute

in

blatant

contravention of the express purpose of the statute."

State

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Clyde, supra, at 1186.
The central fact which should be borne in mind relative
to dismissed counts is that the accused, as a matter of law
and common sense, did not commit the offense alleged. This is
what the court in the criminal matter involving Sheriff
Meacham ruled in dismissing the misuse of public money felony
counts: he did not commit this offense. The acts or omissions
giving rise to this offense did not take place; that is why it
was dismissed. The legal status of the dismissed charge is no
different where it is one count of many, than it would be as
a separate free standing one count information.
So, whether the allegation was one of several arising
from a "single criminal episode" or was one of several which
did not, the fact remains: Sheriff Meacham did not commit the
felony crimes alleged.
him guilty.
is entitled

There was no factual support to find

That is why they were dismissed.
to

reimbursement

That is why he

for

his

defense

of

§

63-30a-2,

of

these

dismissed charges.
B.

The

legislative

history

demonstrates a legislative

intent

to reimburse

employee's legal fees when he has prevailed.

5

U.C.A.,
a public

The county goes to great length to somehow establish that
Hulbert v. State, 607 P.2d 1217 (Utah 1980), should be applied
prospectively in some fashion because "the court in Hulbert
noted that
exoneration

'the result of this vigorous defense was the
of

plaintiff

on

all

12

indictments.f".

(Appellee's Brief, p. 16) This clarifies nothing.

Had Mr.

Hulbert been charged in a single indictment with 12 separate
counts, all of which he was acquitted, the result no doubt
would have been the same.
Had Mr. Hulbert been convicted on one of the indictments,
would the Supreme Court still have applied § 63-30a-2, U.C.A.,
retroactively?

It would be speculation to assert that the

court would or would not have done so based on the decision in
Hulbert.

Likewise, had Mr. Hulbert been charged in 12 counts

joined in a single information, all but one of which were
dismissed, it would be equally speculative to attempt to guess
what the court would have ruled as Hulbert does not address
the issue at all.

Thus, Hulbert v. State has dubious

precedential value to the case at hand.
The county also attempts to engraft sections of the
public employees civil reimbursement statutes, § 63-30-36 and
§ 63-30-37, U.C.A., onto the criminal reimbursement statute,
§ 63-30-a-2, U.C.A.

The two statutory schemes are apples and

oranges. They deal with separate and distinct circumstances.

6

For example, under Chapter 30 the civil employee is not
entitled to be provided a defense, or reimbursement for a
defense if the entity refuses to defend, if the injury or
damage resulted from fraud or malice of the employee (§ 63-3036(3)(b), U.C.A.) or resulted from injury or damage on which
the claim resulted

from the employee driving

influence of alcohol or controlled

substances

under the
(§ 63-30-

36(3)(c), U.C.A.).
Chapter 30a with respect to reimbursement of legal fees
and costs to officers and employees has no similar limitations
or restrictions.

Chapter 30a deals with charges of criminal

behavior and only if the public employee obtains a dismissal
or acquittal may he recover.

The two enactments deal with

separate and distinct circumstances.

Confusion can only

result from attempting a comparison, drawing conclusions from,
or engrafting portions of one upon the other.

Extrapolating

from what is said in the civil reimbursement statute to
explain whatever the county feels should have been, but
clearly was not, stated in the criminal reimbursement statute
is more confusing than helpful.
The appellee's statement that it "would be unfair to
allow Meacham reimbursement of his defense fees . . . when
another county employee sued civilly because of fraudulent
conduct, would
expense."

not

be

allowed

a

defense

at

government

(Appellee's Brief, p. 17). First this statement

7

begs the questions of whether or not Mr. Meacham might not
have been entitled to legal counsel and/or reimbursement for
a

defense

of

the

particular

charges

under

hypothetical

circumstances.
The

felony

charges

were

dismissed.

So

if

a

civil

complaint containing like charges were likewise dismissed, why
should he not be entitled to his attorney's fees?

Moreover,

assuming arguendo that he might be denied his fees in such a
civil

situation,

that

does

not

mean,

under

the

separate

criminal reimbursement statute, that it would be "unfair" to
pay for a criminal defense.

There is no realistic or helpful

comparison between the two statutory schemes.
The appellee cannot logically justify its statement that
"[T]he legislative changes in 1987 [to the civil reimbursement
statute] further limiting the situation when a governmental
entity is required to defend an employee, support the narrow
interpretation the trial judge made of § 63-30a-2. . . . "
(Appellee's Brief, p. 17).

It is difficult to understand in

any sense how changes made to another statute, the civil
reimbursement

statute,

could

in

any

way

effect

the

interpretation of the criminal reimbursement statute.
Similar alterations could arguably have been made by the
legislature

to

the

criminal

specifically were not.

reimbursement

statute,

but

No reference to the changes made in

the civil reimbursement scheme was made by the legislature to

8

or from the criminal reimbursement statute.

They are two

distinct and separate statutes in substance and comparisons of
the

sort

encouraged

by

the county

can

only

result

in

confusion. The better argument is that since the legislature
did not make similar changes to the criminal reimbursement
statute, the legislature specifically intended no such changes
to apply to it.
C.

The criminal reimbursement statute does not require a

blanket "vindication".
The county cites the plurality opinion in Salmon v. Davis
County, 916 P.2d 890 (Utah 1996), for the proposition that
there must be complete vindication (in the sense of having all
counts of a multi-count indictment dismissed) of the public
employee otherwise recovery may not be had.

Nowhere in

Salmon' s various opinions does such a statement or proposition
appear.
The facts in Salmon are that the defendant Salmon, a
Davis County deputy sheriff was charged with two counts of
assault. "Both counts arose out of actions allegedly taken by
Salmon in the course of his employment."

It is not entirely

clear whether there were two counts filed in one information
or

actually

two

informations.

(See

recitation of facts, Salmon at 891).

Justice

Durham's

At any rate, Salmon

prevailed on each count and sued for attorney's fees.
Nowhere in any of the plurality opinion is there any

9

statement to the effect that if Mr. Salmon had not prevailed
on one of the informations, or one of the counts, that he
should

not be entitled

to attorney's

fees on the other.

Complete vindication of the employee as a good person in a
global sense is not necessary.

Neither is it necessary in

this particular situation involving Sheriff Meacham.
As to the three felony counts against Sheriff Meacham
which

were

dismissed

completely vindicated.

upon

motion

of

Mr.

DeLand,

he

was

Reimbursement for his attorney's fees

should consequently be allowed.
POINT II
THE INFORMATION WAS FILED AGAINST SHERIFF MEACHAM
IN CONNECTION WITH OR ARISING OUT OF AN ACT OR
OMISSION OF SHERIFF MEACHAM DURING THE PERFORMANCE
OF HIS DUTIES, WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT
OR UNDER COLOR OF HIS AUTHORITY.
But

for the

fact that Sheriff Meacham

was a

public

official the unfounded felony allegations could not have been
leveled against him.

The felony section he was criminally

charged under, § 76-8-404, U.C.A., focuses its attention on
"any public officer who shall make a profit out of public
monies . . . ."

The court in Meacham? s criminal case ruled

that he did not commit this offense as a matter of law and
dismissed.
A reasonable interpretation of § 63-30a-2, U.C.A., would
certainly be that if the allegations direct themselves to acts
or omissions in connection with or arising out of performance

10

of duty, scope of employment or color of authority, the public
employee is entitled to be reimbursed defense costs upon
dismissal or acquittal.

The facts of Salmon v. Davis Co.,

supra, fully bear this out.
When a public officer, after having been acquitted of a
criminal

charge

comes

before

the

court

to

ask

for

reimbursement, it is because he has won the case, i.e., for
one reason or another he is "vindicated" of the allegations
lodged against him. Under one interpretation of the county's
argument, the accused officer or employee would often be put
in the position of having to prove his guilt with respect to
the criminal allegations which had been dismissed by showing
he

committed

the

reimbursement.

act

alleged

as

a

prerequisite

to

The argument being that if he didn't commit

the act, it wasn't in the course of employment.
course, an untenable position.

This is, of

Mr. Salmon, for instance,

didn't commit assault, but the Supreme Court allowed his fees
nonetheless.

Salmon v. Davis Co.,

supra.

The allegations in the felony matters charged against
Sheriff Meacham set forth acts which were at the very least
committed under color of authority. In Nielson v. Gurley, 888
P.2d 130 (Ut. App. 1994), the appellate court described a
failure

of

Officer

Gurley

to

comply

with

regulations

pertaining to any peace officer or special function officer as
conduct that Gurley engaged in while in the performance of his

11

duties as a state employee and done under color of that
authority.

888 P.2d at 134. Gurlev recognized that failing

to do what is required by the job can be an act or omission
occurring under color of authority.
Color of authority is defined as "that semblance or
presumption of authority sustaining the acts of a public
officer which is derived from his apparent title to the office
. . . ."

Black!s Law Dictionary, Abridged 5th Edition.

The statement of facts set forth by the county evince a
course of action on the part of Sheriff Meacham, i.e., the
submittal of time cards for the purpose of being paid by his
employer, although more than he was entitled, which was
clearly "in connection with" the performance of his duty and
under color of his authority. Factually and legally, the acts
or omissions of the sheriff in working for Uintah County as a
public

officer

and

accepting

monies

on

its

payroll

or

submitting time sheets for monies from the county treasurer as
a public officer, were acts or omissions "in connection with
or arising out of" his duties, employment, or under color of
his authority as alleged in each of the felony counts.
The fact that these acts may have been fraudulent does
not thereby exclude them from being under color of authority.
It has been specifically recognized that a public employee may
participate in fraudulent acts within the scope of employment
or

under

color

of

authority.

12

For

example,

under

the

governmental immunity act, § 63-30-4, U.C.A., a plaintiff may
not bring or pursue a civil action or proceeding against the
employee of a governmental entity unless the employee acted or
failed to act through fraud or malice in the course and scope
of his employment.

§ 63-30-4(3)(b)(i), U.C.A.

See, Ross v.

Schackel, 920 P.2d 1159, 1160, 1161-1162 & 1176 (Utah 1996);
Baker v. Angus, 910 P.2d 427, ftn. 4 (Ct. App. 1996); DeBrv v.
Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 442-443 (Utah 1995). If a fraudulent act
of an employee, solely by virtue of the fraudulence, excluded
it from being within the course and scope of employment,
performance of duties, or under color of authority, this Utah
statute and case law construing it would undoubtedly have so
indicated.
What Sheriff Meacham was accused of doing was profiting
from public moneys under § 76-8-402, U.C.A.
were dismissed.

These felonies

He did not commit these offenses.

Had he

done so, it would have been as a result of his office; it
could not be otherwise. The county's argument that it was an
ultra vires act is illogical in the context of the criminal
reimbursement statute and would yield a result where no public
employee or official could ever obtain reimbursement,
Mr. Salmon's alleged assault in Salmon v. Davis Co..

viz.,
supra.

The county's position that what Sheriff Meacham did or
was alleged to have done was not in connection with or arising
out of the performance of his duty, in the course and scope of

13

his employment, or under color of authority would clearly have
excluded

Mr. Salmon

in Salmon v. Davis Co. , supra,

from

reimbursement of his attorney's fees, because assault is not
an act done in the course and scope of employment.

Again, the

county continues to overlook the fact that Meacham obtained a
dismissal.
If

He did not commit the offense.

Sheriff

Meacham

had

not

allegedly

been

doing

or

failing to do something under color of his authority, or in
connection with or arising out of the scope of his employment
or the performance of his duties for Uintah County he would
not have been charged under § 76-8-404, U.C.A.

This should be

sufficient to trigger the requirement of reimbursement once
the Information is dismissed.
Uintah County's argument is circular and contradictory.
The county argues in essence that if the public employee is
not convicted of the act charging him with violation arising
under color of authority, then he could not have been acting
under color of authority.

It seems to be that only if Sheriff

Meacham were convicted of the felony misuse of public monies,
pursuant to the statute under which he was charged, could it
be said then that he acted in connection with the performance
of his duty, within the scope of his employment,
color of authority.
not so act.

or under

If he did not commit this crime, he did

Yet the county maintains, if he did commit a

crime, any crime, since what he did do was illegal, it could
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not

have

been

within

the

scope

of

employment,

performance of duty, or under color of authority.

in

the

This is a

catch-22.
The felony charges which were dismissed required as a
premise that the individual be a public officer and that he
profit as a result thereof.

By definition the alleged crime

would at least have to be committed under color of authority.
It could occur in no other way.
The examples appellee cites, Birkner v. Salt Lake County,
771 P. 2d 1053 (Utah 1989), and J.H. by D.H. v. West Valley
City, 840 P.2d 115 (Utah 1992), are inapposite.

In both of

these cases sexual abuse was the underlying offense committed
by the public employee.

Sheriff Meacham was not charged with

any such thing so remote and removed from his employment.

He

was charged with profiting from his public employment, and by
virtue of his public office.

Those charges were dismissed.

Nevertheless, but for the alleged acts in connection with the
performance of his duty, scope of his employment, or color of
his authority as a Uintah County Sheriff's Department officer,
he could not and no doubt would not have been charged.
CONCLUSION
Mr. DeLand should be reimbursed for the attorneyf s fees
incurred by Sheriff Meacham pursuant to the assignment.

The

trial court should be reversed and this court should determine
the further attorney's fees which Mr. DeLand is entitled to
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for the necessity of bringing this appeal pursuant to Salmon
v. Davis County, supra.
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